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Recent research suggests that adopting a common currency increases bilateral trade. In this 
paper, I explore experiences of currency union entry in the post-war period and find no effect 
on trade. Previous results derived from a large panel data set (covering more than 200 
countries from 1948 through 1997) appear to depend crucially on the assumption of symmetry 
between currency union exits and entries: While countries leaving a currency union 
experience significant declines in trade, currency union entry appears to have no measurable 
effect on trade. Also, in a detailed analysis of the enlargement of the CFA franc zone, I find 
no consistent results on changes in the pattern of trade. 
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Andrew Rose’s (2000) observation that the use of a common currency is typically 
associated with a disproportionately large volume of bilateral trade between two countries has 
recently attracted considerable attention. At least three stylized facts have emerged from the 
rapidly growing and by now sizable literature on the “Rose effect”. First, the finding that 
common currencies appear to promote trade is extremely robust. Despite a number of serious 
attempts to downsize (and possibly eliminate) the linkage, perturbations to the basic 
regression framework had surprisingly little effect on the overall result. Rose (2004), for 
example, provides a meta-analysis of 19 studies and finds that in all but three of these studies 
the common currency effect on trade (as measured by the preferred estimate of the respective 
author[s]) is economically large and statistically significant; the pooled estimate suggests that, 
holding other things constant, two countries sharing a single currency trade about two times 
more with each other than countries with separate currencies. 
Second, there appears to be considerable heterogeneity in the trade effect across 
different currencies. If one divides currency unions along various lines and examines these 
subgroups separately, the magnitude and significance of the estimate varies substantially; 
disaggregated results are provided, among others, in Eduardo Levy Yeyati (2001) and Nitsch 
(2002, 2004a). Torsten Persson (2001) is also concerned with potential nonlinearities and 
possible problems of non-random selection. Using a (non-parametric) matching technique to 
identify country pairs that share the same characteristics (except membership in a currency 
union), he finds a much less dramatic effect of a common currency. 
Third, it is hard to identify a strong and robust causal relationship between the 
adoption of a common currency and an increase in bilateral trade. Rodney Thom and Brendan 
Walsh (2002) and Nitsch (2004b), for example, provide detailed case studies of switches into 
and out of a currency union and find no measurable change in bilateral trade, after accounting 
for other factors.1 Reuven Glick and Rose (2002) argue that this case study evidence is not 
representative. Taking a broader view and exploring a panel of all post-World War II 
experiences of currency union transitions (for which they have data), they find that a pair of 
countries which switches currency union status experiences a large change in trade. Since 
their sample mainly comprises currency union dissolutions, however, they assume symmetry 
between exits and entries which may be problematic in view of the circumstances under 
                                                 
1 Thom and Walsh (2002) explore the trade effect of Ireland’s break of the pound sterling link 
in 1979. Nitsch (2004b) discusses the formation of the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union 
in 1921. 
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which many currency union exits occurred.2 Alejandro Micco, Ernesto Stein and Guillermo 
Ordoñez (2003) examine evidence from the introduction of the euro and find a moderate trade 
effect for the first four years, but see Helge Berger and Nitsch (2004) for a discussion. 
This short paper aims to contribute to the recent controversy about the causality of the 
common currency effect on trade. It is intended to make two (modest) points. First, I explore 
the effect of currency union entry on trade in a large panel data set. Previous studies have 
either used a panel approach to analyze the combined effect of currency union entries and 
exits (Glick and Rose [2002]) or provided case study examinations of currency union entries 
(e.g., Micco, Stein and Ordoñez [2003]). Second, I explore the trade effect of the gradual 
enlargement of the CFA franc zone in Africa, thereby adding to recent case study evidence for 
other currency unions (most notably the European Monetary Union). Previewing the main 
results, I find no convincing support for the hypothesis that the adoption of a common 
currency leads to an increase in bilateral trade. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some 
additional background, followed by a description of the empirical approach. The results are 
presented in section 4, and section 5 offers some concluding comments. 
 
 
II. Background and Motivation 
One of the most notable innovative contributions of Rose’s research agenda on 
currency unions is the compilation of data sets on countries that are members in a currency 
union.3 Empirical research on currency unions was, for a long time, not only unattractive 
because of the fact that most countries never seriously considered to give up their national 
currency. Rather, the main limitation was the unavailability of relevant data. Only very few 
independent countries have adopted a foreign currency and since most of them were 
extremely small, they were typically not included in standard international data sets.4 
Moreover, if data was available, it was often of poor quality, many observations were 
                                                 
2 Many currency union dissolutions involved colonies which have gained political 
independence and then also gave up the currency of their former colonizer. This process of 
decolonization was typically associated with a number of developments, ranging from a 
gradual dissolution of economic links to the former colonizer (including a redirection of trade 
flows) to military conflicts and civil war, which may have the potential to affect the 
estimation results. See Thom and Walsh (2002) for a discussion. 
3 Given the immense effort to compile the data, Andrew Rose’s policy to make the data sets 
publicly available on his website is extremely generous and helpful. 
4 Examples in Europe include Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, San Marino, Vatican City 
and territories such as the Faroe Islands and Gibraltar. 
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missing, or the available information covered only a few variables and was therefore 
insufficient for the empirical analysis. 
In view of these problems, pooling all the available data in a database appears to be a 
useful remedy. In fact, Jeffrey Frankel (2002, footnote 3) notes that the finding of a 
statistically significant currency union effect on trade “only arose when Rose put together a 
large enough data set for it to show up, [so that] there is little information gained in reducing 
the data set sharply and then noticing the loss in statistical significance.” Moreover, Rose is 
very careful in performing sensitivity analyses and extensions, suggesting that the (pooled) 
estimate is robust to a large variety of perturbations (such as the partial exclusion of 
observations). Given the much smaller and less precise estimates from disaggregated analyses 
and detailed case studies, however, the problems of pooling may be non-negligible; in view of 
these differences, serious concerns arose. 
In this paper, I deal directly with two of these potential complications (in the 
discussion of the issue of causality). For one thing, I focus explicitly on changes in trade for 
countries that have joined a currency union and thereby drop the Glick-Rose assumption of 
symmetry between currency union dissolutions and formations.5 While exits have 
outnumbered entries by a large amount, some few examples of currency union entry in the 
post-war period are, fortunately, available. These include the decisions of the Bahamas and 
Bermuda to switch from a pound sterling link to the US dollar in the late 1960s/early 1970s 
and, more importantly, the accession of Mali and Equatorial Guinea to the CFA franc zone in 
1984, followed by Guinea-Bissau in 1997; a detailed list of all (country pair-wise) switches 
into currency union in the Glick-Rose data set is provided in the appendix. These experiences, 
then, will provide the basis of the empirical analysis in the paper. 
Second, I address the possible problem of aggregation bias in even greater detail. 
Following Nitsch (2002), I allow for differences in the trade effect of currency union entry 
across currencies/countries; that is, I provide disaggregate estimates. Moreover, I deal with 
potential nonlinearities in the data by exploiting a reduced (more homogeneous) sample. In 
particular, I examine (intraregional) trade flows within the CFA franc zone and compare the 
trade patterns of existing currency union members with (the evolution of) trade for late 
                                                 
5 It should be noted that Glick and Rose (2002, p. 1134), defending their assumption, provide 
a short discussion on the symmetry of entries and exits. They find that the exit effect on trade 
is larger than the entry effect, but note that for some specifications the estimated coefficients 
are not statistically different from each other and, in addition, argue that entries tended to take 
place late in the sample which might have biased the estimated effect downwards (due to 
lags). 
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coming entrants; this approach is basically similar to Nitsch (2004a) and Micco, Stein and 
Ordoñez’s (2003) case study of the formation of the European Monetary Union. 
 
 
III. Empirical Methodology 
To identify the common currency effect on trade, Rose (2000) applies a gravity model, 
a standard tool in the empirical analysis of trade flows, augmented with a dummy variable for 
country pairs that use the same currency. The equations to be estimated take the form: 
 
(1) ln(Tijt) = α + β1 ln(YiYj)t + β2 ln(Dij) + γ CUt + Σkδk Xijkt {+ φij}{+ ηt} + εijt
 
where Tijt is the volume of trade between country i and j at time t in real US dollars; Y and D 
are the standard gravity variables, real GDP and distance, respectively; X is a set of other 
conditioning variables (that are typically found to affect bilateral trade flows), including (the 
log product of) real GDP per capita, dummy variables for a common language, a common 
land border, common membership in a regional free trade agreement, a common colonizer, 
current colonial status, previous colonial status, and territories that are part of the same nation 
(e.g., Guadeloupe and Réunion) as well as some geographic factors such as the number of 
islands and landlocked territories in the pair and the (log product of the) land area; {φij} and 
{ηt} are a comprehensive set of country pair- and time-specific fixed effects; and ε is a well-
behaved residual.6 The coefficient of interest is γ, the coefficient on the common currency 
dummy (CU). 
In the actual implementation of this framework, I proceed in several steps. First, I 
estimate equation (1) for a large panel data set (taken from Glick and Rose [2002] and 
covering more than 200 countries for the period from 1948 through 1997 on an annual basis) 
using conventional OLS.7 By including (only) year-specific intercepts, this specification 
essentially captures the cross-country variation in the sample so that γ gives the extent to 
which trade within currency unions deviates from trade between (otherwise identical) 
countries with separate currencies. If I then divide currency unions into those that were in 
                                                 
6 Most of the explanatory variables are constant over time; these time-invariant factors are 
dropped (or, more precisely, subsumed in country-pair dummies) when the regression 
includes country pair fixed effects. 
7 The data set is obtained from Andrew Rose’s website at 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose; see Glick and Rose (2002) for a detailed description of 
the data. 
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existence before 1948 and others that were established after that date, I am able to explore 
possible differences in the trade effect of common currencies for long-time currency union 
members and recent currency union entrants. 
Next, I (additionally) allow for country pair-specific intercepts. This fixed-effects 
“within” estimator explores the time series variation around country-pair averages and 
therefore captures the effects of changes in currency union status on trade. The estimated 
coefficient on the currency union dummy now identifies the difference in trade, for a given 
pair of countries that has experienced a change in the common currency linkage, before and 
after the regime change. As Glick and Rose (2002) rightly note, this is the policy question of 
interest. 
Finally, I repeat these analyses for a smaller subset of countries, focusing on the trade 
performance of countries that have entered the CFA franc zone. For this exercise, I no longer 
rely on the Glick and Rose (2002) data set, but compile the relevant data from original sources 




I begin, as noted above, with a standard cross-section framework for the large panel 
data set taken from Glick and Rose (2002); the results are presented in table 1. In the first 
column, I replicate, for comparison, the (benchmark) regression results from Glick and Rose’s 
table 2. Since the gravity coefficients take on the expected signs with (generally high) levels 
of significance that are standard in the literature, I focus my attention exclusively on the 
variable of interest, the currency union dummy. Glick and Rose define this variable to take the 
value of one for all country pairs in the sample that share a common currency; the estimated 
coefficient on this (pooled) variable indicates that trade between currency union members is 
about 2.7 (=exp[1.3]-1) times larger than trade between countries with different currencies, 
holding other things constant. 
In the next column, I depart from Glick and Rose (2002) and replace the common 
currency dummy by a dummy variable for recent currency union entrants; this binary 
variable, which comprises a subgroup of the pooled currency union dummy, takes the value of 
one only for those country pairs in the sample which have (newly) adopted a common 
currency during the sample period (i.e., after 1948). As one would expect, the estimated 
coefficient on this variable is somewhat smaller in magnitude than the estimate of γ for the 
pooled currency union dummy since the common currency link has been in existence for a 
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shorter period of time.8 Nevertheless, the estimates appear to be strikingly robust. In fact, 
economically, the trade effect is virtually indistinguishable between these two groups of 
currency unions. The effect falls somewhat if one explores the effect for (late) entries to the 
CFA franc zone and dollarizers separately (columns 3 and 4), but also for those cases the 
estimates of γ remain generally economically large and statistically highly significant. 
The main shortcoming of this regression specification using conventional OLS with 
(only) year-specific intercepts is that it completely ignores the time series variation in the 
data. For instance, it is, in principle, easily possible that the γ estimates suffer from 
endogeneity bias, where trade between pairs of countries that form a currency union is already 
disproportionately large before the single currency is adopted (with intense trade relations 
possibly providing an incentive for the establishment of a monetary union). To avoid this bias 
and to fully exploit the panel features of the data set, I therefore add country pair specific 
fixed effects.9 The results are reported in table 2. The first column, again, reproduces the 
results from Glick and Rose (2002); this time the common currency dummy captures the 
(pooled) effects of currency union entries and exits on trade. The γ estimate of 0.65 then 
implies that a change in currency union status is typically associated with a 90 percent 
(=exp[0.65]-1) change in trade. Based on their symmetry assumption, Glick and Rose (2002) 
conclude that this result “implies that joining a currency union leads bilateral trade to […] 
almost double.”  
The results change dramatically, however, if I (again) explore the effects for currency 
union entrants independently. As shown in columns 2 to 4, with this perturbation, the 
estimates of γ become essentially zero; the trade effect vanishes completely. This result 
suggests that Glick and Rose’s pooled estimate is completely driven by the experience of 
currency union exits. There is, in contrast to Glick and Rose’s claim, no evidence that 
currency union entry promotes trade.10
In a next step, I explore in more detail the trade effects of the adoption of the CFA 
franc by three independent countries. Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, which were not 
                                                 
8 Adding a separate dummy variable for the remaining currency unions in the sample, i.e., 
splitting up the original common currency dummy into to separate dummy variables, leaves 
the results unaffected. 
9 I have also experimented with a random effects specification. The results were basically 
unchanged. 
10 In view of the two findings that a pair of countries which has recently joined a currency 
union shares a disproportionate amount of trade, but experiences no measurable increase in 
trade intensity after the adoption of the common currency, estimation problems such as 
endogeneity and nonlinearities may be indeed a serious problem. 
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former French colonies, joined the CFA franc zone in 1984 and 1997, respectively; Mali 
rejoined in 1984, after it had left the arrangement in 1962. Given the already large number of 
member countries in the CFA franc zone, on accession, the acceding countries entered a 
monetary union vis-à-vis many countries simultaneously so that these episodes provide the 
overwhelming majority of observations on currency union entry in the Glick and Rose data 
set. 
I begin, then, with an inspection of the raw data. Table 3 lists the shares of intra-
regional trade by country. Interestingly, there is enormous variation; the shares range from a 
minuscule 1.5 percent for the Republic of Congo to 23.3 percent for Mali. Moreover, the 
intra-regional trade shares are generally low since most of the countries’s trade is with 
industrial countries.  
Figure 1 plots for the joining countries the evolution of bilateral trade with other 
countries in the CFA franc zone.11 At least three observations are noteworthy. First, there is 
large cross-country variation in the availability of data. For some country pairs, there is no 
data at all available; for others, many observations are missing. Second, the quality of the data 
appears to be poor; there are some large fluctuations over time. Third, and most importantly, 
currency union entry (marked by a vertical line) generally had no visible impact on the 
bilateral volume of trade. 
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the previous regression analyses for the CFA franc zone. To 
avoid that nonlinearities affect the results, the sample consists exclusively of CFA franc zone 
members. Hence, the entry dummy captures the extent to which trade of the countries that join 
the CFA franc zone deviates from trade between established currency union members. As 
shown in table 4, the γ estimate is slightly negative but close to zero and statistically 
insignificant for the pooled variable, while the results for individual entrants vary 
considerably. Most strikingly, the estimate for Mali, which was already a member of the CFA 
franc zone until 1962, is negative and highly significant; that is, Mali trades considerably less 
with other countries in the CFA franc zone than existing currency union members (and this 
despite the relatively high share of intra-regional trade in Mali’s total trade). On the other 
hand, Equatorial Guinea appears to have very strong trade linkages with other member 
countries of the CFA franc zone. Bilateral trade involving Guinea-Bissau is not statistically 
different from average intra-CFA franc zone trade. 
                                                 
11 Following Glick and Rose (2002), the volume of bilateral trade is the mean of the reported 
export and import values of the two countries and, thus, is derived from (in principle) four 
observations. 
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Table 5 basically confirms these (individual country) results for the fixed-effects 
specification. Mali’s trade with other CFA franc zone members declines sizably after its re-
entry to the currency union (holding other effects constant), while Equatorial Guinea 
experiences a dramatic increase in trade (by factor 18), and Guinea-Bissau’s trade remains 
largely unchanged (possibly due to its very recent accession). Most notably, however, the 
joint estimate of γ for all three late entrants to the CFA franc zone is negative and statistically 
significant; the coefficient implies a decline in trade by about 26 percent (=exp[-0.31]-1). 
Although I do not intend to interpret this finding too literally (since it is possibly dominated 
by the experience of Mali), the result clearly adds to the skepticism about the trade-enhancing 




Current research on the “Rose effect”, the finding that common currencies appear to 
promote bilateral trade, is mainly concerned with two (controversial) issues, namely: To what 
extent is the “Rose” finding affected by problems of the estimation procedure such as 
problems of pooling? And, to what extent does the finding suffer from problems of 
endogeneity; that is, what is the real effect on trade after the adoption of a common currency? 
A promising approach to deal with these two issues simultaneously is to analyze the recent 
formation of the European Monetary Union. 
In this paper, I follow a different approach. I explore all currency union entries in the 
post-war period, and put a special emphasis on the experiences of the three African countries 
that have joined the CFA franc zone. The results generally confirm skeptic views about the 
“Rose effect”. There is considerable heterogeneity in the trade effect across different 
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Table 1: Cross-Country Evidence on the Common Currency Effect on Trade 
 
     
Currency union  1.30** 
(0.13) 
   
Currency union 
entrant 
  1.29** 
(0.31) 
  
CFA entrant    1.24* 
(0.60) 
 
Dollarizer     0.93* 
(0.41) 










































































































     
Year effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country pair effects? No No No No 
     
R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 
Root MSE 2.02 2.03 2.03 2.03 
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade. 
OLS. Clustering robust standard errors in parentheses. 
**, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Number of observations = 219,558. 
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Table 2: Panel Evidence on the Common Currency Effect on Trade 
 
 
     
Currency union  0.65** 
(0.05) 
   
Currency union 
entrant 
  0.08 
(0.13) 
  
CFA entrant   -0.01 
(0.16) 
 
Dollarizer     0.17 
(0.30) 


















     
Year effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country pair effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 (within) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 
R2 (between) 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 
R2 (overall) 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
     
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade. 
OLS. Clustering robust standard errors in parentheses. 
**, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Number of observations = 219,558. 
Controls not reported: FTA membership; current colony. 
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Table 3: CFA Franc Zone: Intra-Zone Trade, 1970-93 
 
CFA franc countries 
 
 Share of Intra-CFA 
Franc Zone Trade 
Benin 5.1 
Burkina Faso 22.0 
Cameroon 6.1 
Central African Republic 3.5 
Chad 14.5 
Congo, Republic of 1.5 
Cote d’Ivoire 7.6 






Average for CFA franc countries 8.9 
 
West African CFA franc countries 
 
 Share of Intra-CFA 
Franc Zone Trade 
Benin 5.1 
Burkina Faso 22.0 
Cote d’Ivoire 7.6 





Average for West African CFA franc countries 10.6 
 
CFA franc countries 
 
 Share of Intra-CFA 
Franc Zone Trade 
Cameroon 6.1 
Central African Republic 3.5 
Chad 14.5 
Congo, Republic of 1.5 
Equatorial Guinea 16.6 
Gabon 2.6 
Average for Central African CFA franc countries 8.9 
 
Note: Data on Guinea-Bissau is missing. 
Source: Hadjimichael and Galy (1997) 
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Table 4: 
Cross-Country Evidence on the CFA Franc’s Effect on Trade of Entering Countries 
 
 
     
CFA entrant -0.10 
(0.14) 
   





CFA entry  
Equatorial Guinea 
   0.76** 
(0.23) 
 
CFA entry  
Guinea-Bissau 
   -0.05 
(0.28) 










































     
Year effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country pair effects? No No No No 
     
R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 
Root MSE 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63 
     
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade. 
OLS. Clustering robust standard errors in parentheses. 
**, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 









     
CFA entrant -0.31* 
(0.12) 
   





CFA entry  
Equatorial Guinea 
   2.91** 
(0.56) 
 
CFA entry  
Guinea-Bissau 
   -0.39 
(0.30) 








     
Year effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country pair effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
R2 (within) 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 
R2 (between) 0.32 0.35 0.04 0.33 
R2 (overall) 0.21 0.21 0.08 0.20 
     
 
Notes: 
Dependent variable is the log of real bilateral trade. 
OLS. Clustering robust standard errors in parentheses. 
**, * and # denotes statistically robust at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Note: The vertical line marks the entry date. 
 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics. 
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Appendix: Switches into Currency Union in the Glick and Rose (2002) Data Set 
 
 
Currency union members   First year in currency union 
(in the sample) 
 
Benin   Guinea-Bissau 1997 
Benin   Mali   1984 
Benin   Togo   1963 
Cameroon  Equ. Guinea  1985 
Cameroon  Guinea-Bissau 1997 
Cameroon  Mali   1984 
Central Afr. Rep. Mali   1991 
Congo, Rep.  Mali   1984 
Congo, Rep.  Togo   1964 
Cote d’Ivoire  Mali   1984 
Cote d’Ivoire  Togo   1963 
Equ. Guinea  Cote d’Ivoire  1989 
Equ. Guinea  Senegal  1985 
France   Reunion  1976 
France   St. Pierre & M. 1976 
Gabon   Mali   1984 
Guinea-Bissau Cote d’Ivoire  1997 
Guinea-Bissau Senegal  1997 
Guinea-Bissau Togo   1997 
Guinea-Bissau Burkina Faso  1997 
Mali   Niger   1984 
Mali   Senegal  1984 
Mali   Togo   1984 
Mali   Burkina Faso  1984 
Niger   Togo   1963 
Senegal  Togo   1963 
Togo   Burkina Faso  1966 
Qatar   U.A.E.   1981 
United Kingdom Kuwait  1961 
United Kingdom Oman   1970 
United States  Bahamas  1966 
United States  Bermuda  1970 
 
Notes: The total number of observations in the data set is 426,792, but about one-half of these 
observations are not used in the regressions because relevant information is missing. Also 
note that the listing of Togo as a currency union entrant is largely for technical reasons. As a 
member of the CFA franc zone, Togo introduced a national currency on January 1, 1963 but 
resumed using the CFA franc on November 27, 1963. The Togolese franc was equal to the 
CFA franc and existed only as a unit of account, not as notes or coins (see Kurt Schuler’s 
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